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Abstract
Opioid abuse is currently the most significant public health problem in the US. Many US
states have implemented prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) in response. In
the rst paper, I use a new micro-level medical claims database to exploit state-level and
time-series variations in PDMP implementation and shed light on the impacts of these
programs. My results show that PDMPs have led to an overall 14% reduction in the odds
ratio of abuse/addiction. Also, there is evidence of substantial heterogeneity in impacts,
with larger impacts for females and minorities. Another nding is that at least 23% of
opioid abuse is a result of drug diversion to nonmedical opioid users. PDMPs were not
successful in decreasing the rate of abuse for this group, and, in fact, there is some
evidence that they increased the diversion to heroin. Finally, I show that PDMPs'
eectiveness varies by type of insurance and that they are more eective in reducing abuse
rates in the general population as compared with Medicare Part D recipients. I use my
estimates to analyze the potential eects of modifying PDMPs to include giving insurance
providers access to electronic databases, providing educational programs for less-educated
people, and expanding their \must access" requirement. In the second chapter, I estimate
dierent models for opioid demand and compare their performance. My results suggest
that the NB2 and Poisson FE models best match the data. Using these models for
calculating the marginal effect of insurance characteristics provides suggestive evidence of
the best insurance design to reduce the demand for opioids.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN HEALTH ECONOMICS
Zahra Mohammadi
Petra Todd
Opioid abuse is currently the most significant public health problem in the US. Many US
states have implemented prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) in response. In
the first paper, I use a new micro-level medical claims database to exploit state-level and
time-series variations in PDMP implementation and shed light on the impacts of these
programs. My results show that PDMPs have led to an overall 14% reduction in the odds
ratio of abuse/addiction. Also, there is evidence of substantial heterogeneity in impacts,
with larger impacts for females and minorities. Another finding is that at least 23% of
opioid abuse is a result of drug diversion to nonmedical opioid users. PDMPs were not
successful in decreasing the rate of abuse for this group, and, in fact, there is some
evidence that they increased the diversion to heroin. Finally, I show that PDMPs’
effectiveness varies by type of insurance and that they are more effective in reducing abuse
rates in the general population as compared with Medicare Part D recipients. I use my
estimates to analyze the potential effects of modifying PDMPs to include giving insurance
providers access to electronic databases, providing educational programs for less-educated
people, and expanding their “must access” requirement. In the second chapter, I estimate
different models for opioid demand and compare their performance. My results suggest
that the NB2 and Poisson FE models best match the data. Using these models for
calculating the marginal effect of insurance characteristics provides suggestive evidence of
the best insurance design to reduce the demand for opioids.
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CHAPTER 1 : The Effects of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs on the
Opioid Abuse Epidemic
Abstract: Opioid abuse is currently the most significant public health problem
in the U.S. Many U.S. states have implemented prescription drug monitoring
programs (PDMPs) in response. In this paper, I use a new micro-level med-
ical claims database to exploit state-level and time-series variations in PDMP
implementation and shed light on the impacts of these programs. My results
show that PDMPs have led to an overall 14% reduction in the odds ratio of
abuse/addiction. Also, there is evidence of substantial heterogeneity in im-
pacts, with larger impacts for females and minorities. Another finding is that
at least 23% of opioid abuse is a result of drug diversion to nonmedical opioid
users. PDMPs were not successful in decreasing the rate of abuse for this group,
and, in fact, there is some evidence that they increased the diversion to heroin.
Finally, I show that PDMPs’ effectiveness varies by type of insurance and that
they are more effective in reducing abuse rates in the general population as
compared with Medicare Part D recipients. I use my estimates to analyze the
potential effects of modifying PDMPs to include giving insurance providers ac-
cess to electronic databases, providing educational programs for less-educated
people, and expanding their “must access” requirement.
1
1.1. Introduction
Prescription drug abuse has been described by the Centers for Disease Control as an epi-
demic in the United States. The rate of drug overdose deaths in the United States in 2015
was more than 2.5 times the rate in 1999, with the greatest percentage increase among
adults aged 55-64 (from 4.2 per 100,000 in 1999 to 21.8 in 2015) (Hedegaard et al. (2017)).
Based on the National Survey of Drug Use and Health, nearly all prescription drugs involved
in overdoses are originally prescribed by a physician, rather than, for example, being stolen
from pharmacies. Thus, policy makers are increasingly focusing attention on preventing the
overprescription of drugs and their subsequent diversion to people other than the patient.
The main policy response to this prescription drug epidemic is the introduction of Prescrip-
tion Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs), which are in place in all states as of 2017. As
part of these programs, statewide electronic databases have been set up to track prescrip-
tions dispensed for controlled substances. Information collected can be used to identify
diverted drugs as well as to facilitate the identification of prescription drug-addicted indi-
viduals (Finklea et al. (2014)). There are a variety of studies examining the effectiveness
of PDMPs as implemented in different states. Haegerich et al. (2014) summarize studies
relevant to PDMPs until 2012 and suggest that “PDMP evaluations have detected some
positive changes in prescribing patterns, decreased use of multiple providers and pharma-
cies, and decreased substance abuse treatment admissions and poison center report rates
(although findings are mixed).”
In this paper, I evaluate the effects of PDMPs using a new micro-level medical claim dataset,
the Clinformatics Data Mart, consisting of 19 million people in 25 states from 2001-2012.
First, I perform a descriptive analysis of the trends in substance abuse/addiction during
2001-2012 for different substances including opioids, cocaine, cannabis, and amphetamines.
I study the correlation between opioid abuse and different substances and possible impli-
cations for the characteristics of the abuser population. Second, I use the time and state
variation in the implementation of PDMPs to perform a difference-in-difference analysis of
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the effects of PDMPs on abuse/addiction reduction, after controlling for time, state, and
demographic effects. Further, I study the heterogeneous impact of the program on different
subsamples. I measure how program effectiveness varies by demographic groups and by type
of insurance. Third, I combine medical claims with pharmacy claims to identify possible
cases of nonmedical opioid abuse, which sheds light on the extent of diversion of opioids
from patients to nonmedical abusers. I evaluate the effectiveness of the PDMPs for medical
versus nonmedical opioid users by looking at the medical history of each patient. Finally,
I study the effectiveness of the program in changing the patterns of prescriptions among
providers and the overall probability of taking opioids in the study population. In this
section, I perform an analysis similar to Buchmueller and Carey (2017) and Kilby (2016)
and compare the results of my study to that of the latest studies conducted on different
population groups including Medicare and employer-sponsored individuals.
The Clinformatics Data Mart dataset includes individuals from diverse backgrounds repre-
sentative of the U.S. population, which enables me to generalize my results to the entire
U.S. population. Also, the large sample sizes allow for rich subgroup analysis. Another
difference between my study and previous studies is the long time span of data coverage,
which makes it possible to test the difference-in-difference assumption of parallel trends
and to only include comparison group states that are similar to states that implemented
PDMPs. Finally, as individuals’ access to prescription drugs also depends to a large extent
on their health insurance policies, having detailed information about insurance providers
gives me the opportunity to study one of the factors that has not been considered in previous
research.
Another novel feature of my analysis is to use the medical claims data as a basis for under-
standing the problem of drug diversion. Some studies only include people observed to have
at least one opioid prescription, but my results show that, among the abuser population, at
least 23% did not fill any opioid prescriptions during the year of treatment. My results show
that there is not necessarily a close correspondence between dose of medication prescribed
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and propensity for abuse.
My results show an overall 14% reduction in odds of abuse/addiction. The effect is slightly
higher for females compared with males, and for blacks compared with whites. The effect is
seen most clearly in the low-income population and also in highly educated people. PDMPs
decreased the odds of abuse by 17% among low-income families, and 12% for middle-income
families; there was no significant effect for high-income families. These programs also de-
creased the odds of abuse by 16% among bachelor degree holders, while no significant effect
was evident for people with less than a high school education. PDMPs’ effectiveness varies
significantly by type of insurance: The odds of abuse reduced 19% for those with HMOs
and 11% for those with EPOs, and there was no significant effect for those with PPOs or
POS plans. This is intuitive given that insurance policies lead to different patient-provider
matches due to in-network and out-of-network provisions. I can see that, although PDMPs
provide similar information to all providers, the insurance structure matters for the effec-
tiveness of these programs for each demographic subgroup analyzed. A caveat is that it
could be possible that people who have an opioid abuse problem would choose insurances
that are more generous and more lenient when it comes to getting access to providers that
give prescriptions.
Prescription claim histories show that at least 23% of opioid abusers do not have any in-
surance claims for opioid purchases, which means at least 23% of abuse/addiction cases are
the result of opioid diversion. There is no significant effect from PDMPs in abuse/addiction
reduction among individuals without opioid prescription claims. Finally, PDMPs have af-
fected other outcomes, including the number of pharmacies and providers visited by patients
and quantities of prescribed medications.
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1.2. Background
1.2.1. Opioid for pain management
Opium has been used for pain management for centuries. The opioid family of drugs
continues to be a major part of pain management in medical practice today (Ballantyne
and Mao (2003)). Despite its pervasive use, there is little certainty on opioid therapy’s risks
and benefits.
The first opioid epidemic occurred in the late 19th century, which resulted in the first
legal attempts to restrict access to these drugs. In addition to these legal attempts, the
introduction of other pain medications limited the use of opioids.
In the late 1980s, however, there was a shift in the discussion of chronic noncancer pain
management. Portenoy and Foley (1986) studied 38 cases of long-term opioid therapy,
asserting that it was a “humane alternative” to other forms of pain management (e.g.,
surgery). Similarly, Zenz et al. (1992) observed 100 patients taking opioid therapy lasting
224 days on average and found no cases of addiction. They thus declared opioid therapy as
an effective treatment for long-term pain management without addiction being an important
concern. Papers with similar conclusions emerged in subsequent medical literature (Fink
(2000), Portenoy (1996)). On the ground, the introduction of OxyContin in 1995 shifted
the treatment of pain drastically. Purdo Pharma funded more than 20,000 pain-related
educational programs to alter physicians’ and medical professionals’ perceptions of opioid
therapy. Although there were no clinical trials to assess the safety of long-term opioid
treatment for noncancer patients, the company cited some methodologically flawed papers
claiming that the risk of addiction was as low as 1% (Kolodny et al. (2015)). By 1998,
“[k]ey organizations that strongly support[ed] the use of opioids to treat chronic pain [...]
published consensus statements to guide physicians in prescribing these drugs” (Ballantyne
and Mao (2003)).
With these developments, in 1996, the rate of opioid use started to increase. This was
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followed by an increase in the rate of mortality and morbidity by opioids, but it took policy
makers some time to realize that it was not only the nonmedical users who were at risk of
overdose. Pain patients who were addicted to opioids were a group that was very likely to
overdose on these drugs (Kolodny et al. (2015)). Furlan et al. (2006), in a meta-analysis of
opioid therapy studies, inferred that, despite common belief, “[a]ddiction or opioid abuse
in patients with chronic pain cannot be assumed not to exist” because the length of trials
are too short for development of addictive behaviors. Martell et al. (2007) investigated the
case of patients with chronic back pain and found that, although the effectiveness of these
drugs for long-term pain management was unclear, abusive behavior developed in around
25% of the patients. Another review by Højsted and Sjøgren (2007) suggested that the
risk of addiction could be as high as 50% in noncancer pain patients. Furthermore, Dunn
et al. (2010) investigated the relationship between prescribed doses of opioids and abusive
behavior and concluded that “[p]atients receiving higher doses of prescribed opioids are
at increased risk of opioid overdose, underscoring the need for close supervision of these
patients.”
In response to this growing public health risk, policy makers first targeted illegal access, but
as inappropriate use among patients became more clear by 2005, different policies focusing
on this segment emerged. The Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, which are described
in the following section, are the most important of these policies.
1.2.2. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) are state-administered databases that
contain information on the prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances. Informa-
tion contained in the PDMPs may be used by doctors and pharmacists to identify patients
who may be doctor shopping (seeing multiple doctors to obtain prescriptions), need sub-
stance abuse treatment, or are at risk for overdose. In accordance with state laws, PDMP
information may also be used by state regulatory and law enforcement officials to pur-
sue cases involving inappropriate prescribing or dispensing, so-called “pill mills,” or other
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sources of diversion.
The first PDMP was established in California in 1939, and as the need to collect data on
prescription drugs for law enforcement and monitoring purposes grew, eight more states
established this program by 1989. In this period, which is called the “Paper Era” of the
PDMPs, the information was mainly used by law enforcement agencies to curtail diversion.
By 1990, the “Electronic Era” of the PDMPs began, which made the sharing of data easier
between providers, pharmacists, and drug agencies. In the next decade, the steady rise
in the abuse and diversion of controlled substances further increased the importance of
PDMPs, and eventually there was a drive to align and consolidate the programs in different
states, which so far differed vastly in regulations and implementation. Thus started the
“Federal Era” of the PDMPs in 2002, when the the National Alliance for Model State Drug
Laws (NAMSDL) drafted a model program outlining common goals that should be shared
among existing and new PDMPs (Blumenschein et al. (2010)). As a result, PDMPs that
were enacted in states after 2003 were very similar, and their enactment can be viewed as
a natural experiment in contrast to the early PDMPs that were started in states with high
abuse rates.
The impact of PDMPs has been studied in three main areas: effects on provider behavior,
patient behavior, and health outcomes. PDMPs resulted in a decrease in the number of
prescriptions for schedule II narcotics such as oxycodone but resulted in an increase in pre-
scriptions for schedule III pain killers such as hydrocodone, which are easier to prescribe.
Overall, however, these programs decreased inappropriate prescription behaviors. For pa-
tients, PDMPs decreased patients’ visits to multiple pharmacies and discouraged doctor
shopping. A survey of Ohio, California, and Kentucky prescribers shows that access to new
information on patient history through PDMPs has changed their prescription behavior.
Results from Wyoming, Nevada, Massachusetts, and Maine show that mandatory access
to the PDMPs has decreased both doctor shopping and prescribed doses by doctors (PMP
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Center of Excellence (2012), Haegerich et al. (2014)).1
The effects of PDMPs on health outcomes are less clear. Simeone and Holland (2006),
found a significant reduction in substance abuse treatment admission, and Reifler et al.
(2012), show a significant decline in the rate of growth of abuse. On the other hand, while
Reifler et al. (2012), and ? found a decline in abuse-related admissions, it was statistically
insignificant, and Paulozzi et al. (2011) found no significant change in drug overdose mor-
tality (Haegerich et al. (2014)). Meara et al. (2016) studied disabled Medicare beneficiaries
as a high-risk group and concluded that “[a]doption of controlled-substance laws was not
associated with reductions in potentially hazardous use of opioids or overdose.”
Some studies suggest the primary factor behind insignificant health benefits from PDMPs
is low or infrequent access of the database by prescribers. A 2015 study of primary care
prescribers found that, while a majority reported having obtained data from their PDMP
at some point in time, where participation in the PDMP was voluntary prescribers checked
the patient history only 14% of the time before prescribing an opioid (Rutkow et al. (2015),
PMP Center of Excellence). In line with this finding, most recent studies focusing on the
attributes of the program show a higher degree of success. Buchmueller and Carey (2017)
provide evidence that “must access” PDMPs significantly reduce measures of misuse in
Medicare Part D. In contrast, PDMPs without such provisions have no effect.
As far as I know, the effectiveness of PDMPs for people with different individual character-
istics is not studied in the literature. Although it is known that the risk hazard of opioid
abuse is different among different population groups. For example, Paulozzi (2012) summa-
rizes the literature on prescription drug use through 2011 and concludes that demographic
characteristics most likely associated with abuse include being male, middle aged, white,
low income, and suffering from mental health issues. African Americans and Hispanics are
less likely to be prescribed any drugs (Gu et al. (2010)), including controlled prescription
1Haegerich et al. (2014) summarize studies relevant to PDMPs, including Pletcher et al. (2008), Curtis
et al. (2006), Simoni-Wastila and Qian (2012), Wastila and Bishop (1996), Reisman et al. (2009), Simeone
and Holland (2006), Dormuth et al. (2012), Ross-Degnan et al. (2004), Pearson et al. (2006).
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drugs (National Center for Health Statistics (2006)), and are less likely to report nonmedical
use of prescription pain relievers (SAMHSA (2014a)).
1.3. Data
My primary dataset is the medical and prescription drug claims dataset, Clinformatics Data
Mart (CDM) for years 2001-2012. CDM contains administrative health claims for members
of a large national managed-care company affiliated with OptumInsight. It includes individ-
uals with both medical and prescription drug coverage, and collects data for approximately
15 million people annually, for a total of more than 40 million unique individuals over a
10-year period. CDM largely consists of commercial health plan data but also contains
historic claims for Managed Medicaid and Medicare.2 The population is geographically
diverse, spanning all 50 states. CDM includes demographic and geographic information
relating to gender, age, and state of residence, in addition to medical and pharmacy claims.
I include the states that implemented the PDMP for the first time between 2003 and 2012.3
Prescription drug monitoring programs that were implemented during this period belong
to the “Federal Era” of the PDMP and have generally similar characteristics. Because the
implementation of the policies can happen anytime during a year, I will consider PDMPs
being active in a year if the user access date began before July of that year.
The PDMP Training and Technical Assistance Center (TTAC) and the National Alliance
for Model State Drug Laws (NAMSDL) are the main sources providing information on
the date of operation for PDMP programs, with some disparities for a couple of states.
NAMSDL reflects the date that prescribers and/or dispensers were allowed to have access
to PDMP information, whether electronic or hard copy, while TTAC’s category reflects the
date that the programs began receiving and storing data electronically.4 Table 1 reports
2Medicare Choice after 2006 and Medicaid after 2011 are not included, so I removed these individuals
from my analysis.
3No state started its program in 2001 or 2002.
4This information is provided by Heather Gray, the legislative director of National Alliance for Model
State Drug Laws.
9
the implementation date provided by NAMSDL.5 In addition, I use the Prescription Drug
Abuse Policy System, which provides detailed data of variation in state laws regarding
implementation of PDMPs up until 2016 using the relevant legislative documentation to
examine the similarities and disparities among the states in my study.6 States that I
include in my analysis provide access to prescribers, dispensers, and the regulatory board.
Dispensers have to report data to PDMPs; however, access to PDMPs before prescribing
is not mandatory, and PDMPs are not allowed to share the data with private insurers.
PDMPs differ in their permission or requirement to identify suspicious activity and take any
action, such as reporting suspicious activities to law enforcement or the provider/dispenser.
By restricting the data to these 25 states, and to people 11 to 65 years of age, my final
sample includes around 6 million people annually, which is approximately 19 million unique
individuals total.
1.3.1. Trends in prescription drug abuse/dependence, co-occurrence with other substance
use disorders
There have been some controversies about the underlying factors for opioid abuse or depen-
dence, as these drugs differ from other street drugs in that they are the only ones that can
be accessed for legitimate medical reasons but lead to dependence. At first, policy makers
assumed that abuse or dependence on these products occurs only among people who do not
have a medical prescription for opioids; however, they later found that there is such a thing
as accidental dependence. The possibility of opioid abuse/dependence among medical users
shifted the focus of drug control from solely the distribution level to the patient level.
Incidence of abuse/dependence among pain patients suggests that long-term opioid therapy
may lead to dependence and abuse. At the same time, nonmedical abuse is also prevalent.
Surveys show that the main source for nonmedical use of opioids is prescriptions written for
friends or family members, which suggest over-prescription of these drugs. Understanding
5Accessed on June 2015: http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/PPTs/LE2012/1 Giglio HistoryofPDMPs.pdf
6Data accessed on Oct 2016 at www.pdaps.org.
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the inherent differences between these two groups of people, medical and nonmedical users,
is important for effective policy making.
Surveys on nonmedical users of opioids suggest that these people are also more likely to
abuse other drugs (McCabe et al. (2008)); therefore, studying the demographics of abusers
with multiple substance problems, in combination with their medical history, should pro-
vide a picture of these types of abusers and how they differ from patients on opioid therapy
who ended up as abusers. At first, I look at the trend of abuse or dependence for differ-
ent substances. I identify substance abuse, addiction or poisoning by applying the ICD-97
codes listed in Table 2 to the five provided diagnoses codes in each medical record. De-
scriptions associated with each ICD-9 code are provided in the documentation for the CDM
data.8Similar diagnoses in a given day, or as part of one insurance claim, counts as one
visit. Figure 1 provides the number of visits during 2001-2012 for each substance. A visit
to an inpatient or outpatient facility can be the result of abuse of multiple drugs, each one
recorded with a different diagnosis code. I count the substance reported first as the primary
substance.
The total cases of substance abuse/dependence more than doubled during these 10 years,
but the growth has been fastest for the opioid drug family. The total number of admissions
in this group more than quadrupled. Further, the rates and trends in admissions by each
cause, especially for alcohol and opioids, are similar to those reported by SAMHSA (2014b),
which confirms that this dataset closely represents the United States population. Table 3
shows that more than 99% of opioids reported in cases of abuse/dependence are prescription
opioids. The share of these drugs is constantly increasing, while the percentage of heroin-
related cases decreased from 0.53% to 0.36%, and methadone-related cases decreased from
7International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision.
8I use ICD-9 codes provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to identify poison-
ing cases: https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pdo guide to icd9cm and icd10 codesa.pdf; I use the de-
scription provided for each code to identify the cases of addiction for each substance. My list is similar to
other studies with slight differences; for example, Meara et al. (2016) use similar codes to identify nonfatal
opioid-related abuse cases, but they also include E950.0, which is associated with suicide. In addition to
that, my list includes dependence to opioid cases.
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0.29% to 0.09%.9
The studies based on the treatment admission data without specific individual identifiers
may provide biased information about the characteristics of the population under study. I
estimate the average number of visits for each type of drug abuse/dependence by dividing
the total number of visits in each category by the total number of unique individuals in
each one. Table 4 shows these multiple visits during a year are common for all type of
substances. A person with an opioid abuse or dependence problem on average visits in-
patient or outpatient facilities seven times a year. So instead of studying the population
characteristics of admitted people, it is more informative to investigate the effect of policies
to the number of unique individuals with a treatment record for abuse or addiction.10
To study the population characteristics of the abusers, I aggregated the data annually,
indicating if each individual had cases of abuse/dependence for alcohol, opioids, cocaine,
amphetamines, or cannabis. Figure 2 shows the number of people who visited medical
providers for any substance misuse during 2001-2012. The trends are similar to those
reported by SAMHSA (2014a), which comes from the National Survey on Drug Use and
Health. In 2001, the number of people with cannabis abuse problems was about 20% higher
than those with opioid abuse/addiction. But opioid cases have grown much faster, and
by 2012, there were twice as many cases of opioid abuse. Fortunately, the total number
of individuals with cocaine abuse problems declined, and the number has stayed almost
constant since 2005 for those with cannabis and amphetamine abuse problems. Table 5
shows that there is a high correlation between the abuse of different types of substances,
with the highest being 0.35 for the correlation between opioid and other medications abuse.
The correlation between abuse of opioids and other substances, including cocaine, cannabis,
and amphetamines is 0.18, 0.14, and 0.10, respectively. For the rest of the data summary,
9Cases of methadone abuse/dependence are identified with ICD-9 codes that are different from other
prescription opioids as reported in Table 2. For the rest of the analysis, I consider methadone as part of
prescription opioid cases.
10SAMHSA (2014b) and other studies using the TED dataset used these types of analyses because of the
lack of identifiers for individuals.
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I focus on individuals with a prescription opioid abuse/dependence history.
Table 6 shows that people who visit medical providers for only opioid misuse are on average
3.5 years older than people who get admitted for a combination of drugs, including opioids.
This provides some suggestive evidence that the older population uses opioids for medical
reasons rather than for recreational purposes. Figure 3 shows the percentage of the people
abusing opioids in each age group during 2001-2012. The probability of abuse is almost the
same, 0.1%, among those 18-54 years of age in 2001, but it is increasing with a different
rate among different age groups. The probability goes to 0.79% for those 18-23 years of
age (620% rate of growth) and 0.55% for those 24-33 years of age (399% rate of growth).
The rate of growth is drastic among the elderly as well, it goes from 0.06% to 0.26% (376%
increase).
Providers prescribe opioids differently for different demographics based on age, gender, and
income or race/ethnicity. Pletcher et al. (2008) argue that white people are more likely to
get opioids for pain-related admissions to emergency rooms in comparison with other races,
and even the “national quality improvement initiatives” of the 1990s did not reduce this
gap. PDMPs aim to provide information about the medical history of patients to improve
the practice of prescribing controlled drugs, but it is not clear how these programs affect the
already existing biases. I will investigate this using regression analysis in the next section.
1.4. Econometric Analysis
1.4.1. Effect of PDMPs on prescription opioid and heroin abuse/dependence
I first consider the effect of PDMP implementation on the abuse/dependence of prescription
opioids and heroin in the whole population. I estimate the following regression models:
yit = α+ γi + λt + τ(pdmpst) + ist (1.1)
yit = α+ γi + λt +
l=+4∑
l=−4
τl(pdmps,t+l) + ist (1.2)
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Here, yit is an indicator for patient i abusing either heroin or prescription opioids in year
t, γi is the individual fixed effect, λt is the time fixed effect, pdmpst is an indicator for
active PDMP in state s during year t, and pdmps,t+l is an indicator for active PDMP in
year t+ l. The event study analysis in the second equation is necessary to test the validity
of the parallel trend assumption in difference-in-difference analysis; it confirms that the
implementation of PDMPs for the set of states included in my analysis qualifies as a natural
experiment. Figure 4 shows the estimation results of equation 1.2. It is clear that after
controlling for individual and year fixed effects, there is no significant trend in the abuse
of prescription opioids or heroin before implementation of PDMPs among states included
in my data. Figure 4 shows that the implementation of PDMPs reduced the probability
of prescription drug abuse/dependence but gradually increased the probability of heroin
abuse/dependence. The increase becomes significant two years after the program.
1.4.2. Effect of PDMPs on prescription opioid abuse/dependence in subsamples
In this section, I study the individual characteristics that determine the effectiveness of
the programs in reducing prescription opioid abuse/dependence for each subsample. I first
estimate the model including individual characteristics and the interaction between charac-
teristics and PDMP implementation instead of individual fixed effects:
yit = α+ γs + λt + τpdmpst +Xitβ0 + pdmp×Xitβ1 + it
In which Xit is a vector including age, gender, race, income, education, and type of in-
surance. I use the logistic regression in order to accommodate the smaller sample size in
some of the subgroups. In Table 7, I report the results of this estimation in comparison to
the model without individual controls and the model without the interaction of individual
characteristics and PDMP implementation. The interaction terms, although not reported
here, are significant and different among different demographic groups. To investigate this
heterogeneity more closely, I divide people by their income, race, gender, education, and
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type of insurance. Then I estimate a similar logistic regression for each group:
yit = α+ γs + λt + τpdmpst +Xitβ0 + it
Xit includes all individual characteristics not used in categorizing people in subsamples.
Although the type of insurance seems to be an endogenous variable, it is unlikely that it
will be affected by the event of abuse or addiction. In Table 9, I show that the effectiveness of
the program decreases by family income even after controlling for education level. The odds
of opioid abuse decreases by around 18% for individuals from low-income families (less than
$40,000), 10 to 13% for individuals from middle-income families ($40,000-$75,000), while
having no significant effect for people from higher-income families. Table 10 shows that the
effectiveness increases by individuals’ education level; people with a higher education are
less likely to abuse prescription opioids after implementation of PDMPs. The reduction in
the odds ratio is the highest for those with bachelor degrees (17%). PDMPs subsequently
decrease the odds ratio of those with bachelor degree by 16% and those with high-school
diploma by 11%. It is important to notice that these effects are estimated after controlling
for family income level, age, and gender, which suggest one mechanism for effectiveness of
these programs is informing individuals about the risks of opioid use.
Table 11 reports the results by the type of insurance. It suggests that HMO insurance
holders benefit the most from PDMPs, followed by those with EPOs. PDMPs resulted
in a 20% reduction of the odds of abuse for those with HMOs, a 12% reduction for those
with EPOs and no significant effect for people with PPOs or POSs. This is intuitive given
that insurance policies lead to different patient-provider matches due to in-network and
out-of-network provisions. I can see that, although PDMPs provide similar information
to all providers, the insurance structure matters for the effectiveness of PDMPs for each
demographic subgroup analyzed. A caveat is that it could be possible that people who have
an opioid abuse problem would choose insurances that are more generous and more lenient
when it comes to getting access to providers that give prescriptions.
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1.4.3. Relationship between the abuse/dependence and prescription
The next step in analyzing the abuse/dependence of prescription opioids is to understand
the relationship between abuse and prescriptions for opioids. To investigate the relationship
between abuse and prescription. I assign an indicator rx = 1 to each individual-year if a
person has an opioid prescription filled during that year. I identify narcotic in prescription
claims data using universal standard classification codes (usc-id) provided by the CDM
for each drug. ‘022**’ is the usc-id code for any form of narcotics, tablet, capsule, patch,
etc., at any strength, including less controlled and more easily prescribed narcotics such as
acetaminophen-codeine. There are hundreds of different opioids in the data with the highest
frequency being for oxycodone, hydrocodone, codeine, and propoxyphene. To have a valid
measure to compare different prescriptions over time, I use the morphine equivalent of each
prescription by multiplying the quantity of the drug being prescribed by the milligram
morphine equivalent (mme) factor for each drug and then aggregating the data for each
individual for each year to find the total mme of prescribed medication. In addition, I find
the total days of supply, the number of distinct pharmacies, and the providers that each
patient visited to get prescriptions for opioids, which I will use in the next section. Then,
I combine medical history with prescription claims data to investigate the effects of being
prescribed any type of narcotics in opioid abuse/dependence.
Information from Table 12 shows that 69.3% of the people did not fill any prescription for a
narcotic during their coverage period in my data. Among the 30.7% of the people who have
been prescribed opioids, only 0.92% have records of abuse/addiction. On the other hand,
among the narcotic abusers/addicts, we can see that 22.98% never filled a prescription.
This table shows that the problem of diversion of drugs is serious. It is important to
notice that this table overestimates the number of prescriptions for narcotics. I include all
the prescriptions filled for any type of narcotics at any dose and quantity. The morphine
content of some prescriptions is very small, which makes it impossible to cause any sort of
abuse or addiction.
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In Table 5, I look at the population that has ever been prescribed any narcotics and the
population of abusers separately throughout the years from 2001 to 2012. In the sample
of people who have abused opioids in each year, around 37% had not been prescribed any
opioids in 2001, and this number increased throughout the years, which means that abuse
of narcotics without prescriptions prevails over these years. These numbers are just a rough
estimate, since patients could save prescriptions in a given year and abuse them in the
future. But as we saw in Table 12, even after pooling the data over the years, the number
of abusers/addicts with no prescriptions is at least as high as 23%, so the actual number
may be somewhere in between. In the subsample of people who received opioid medication,
0.49% abused opioids in 2001, and this number constantly increased and reached 1.25% in
2012. As we saw in Table 12, even if we include all the prescription claims throughout the
coverage, only 1% of total individuals filling a prescription ended up abusing it themselves.
Although different surveys show that friends and family are the main sources of opioids
among nonmedical users (McCabe et al. (2007)), it is not possible to find the source of
these drugs in my data. It is only possible to study the demographic of this population to
provide a more accurate guideline for providers. In Figure 6, it is clear that the distribution
of the age of nonmedical abusers is tilted to the left, suggesting that the younger population
uses these drugs for recreational purposes, especially people younger than 24 years of age.
On the other hand, among those 54-64 years of age, it is twice as likely for abusers to be
getting the drugs through prescription rather than other sources. I similarly look at the
patterns by other demographics. Although not as clear as in the case of age, it seems that
whites and females who abuse opioids are more likely to get them through prescriptions.
I estimate the effectiveness of PDMPs in preventing diversion by estimating a regression
model similar to that of the previous section for two groups of people—those who filled any
prescription for opioids and those who have not:
yit = α+ γs + λt + τpdmpst +Xitβ0 + it
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Xit includes total mme and days of supply of medication for people who filled any pre-
scription for opioids. Table 13 shows that, after controlling for mme and days of supply,
implementation of PDMPs reduced the odds of opioid abuse by 10% among patients, but
they did not have any significant effect on the abuse of opioids among nonmedical users.
One of the goals of PDMPs was to reduce the diversion of opioids by restricting the access
to these drugs among patients, but my results suggest that these programs did not provide
any benefit of this sort.
1.4.4. Patterns of opioid prescription
One of the more studied aspects of PDMPs is the effect they have in the patterns of
prescriptions. I perform a series of analyses similar to Kilby (2016) and Buchmueller and
Carey (2017). I estimate the model:
yit = α+ γs + λt + τpdmpst + it
In which yit measures total mme for each patient i at year t. The results in Table 16
show a reduction in prescribed opioids similar to the finding in Kilby (2016) from analyzing
Automated Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) data. But none of the
specifications resulted in a significant estimation.
I follow the Buchmueller and Carey (2017) method in constructing some proxy measures
of misuse consisting of quantity-based outcomes and shopping outcomes. The first measure
is the share of enrollees who took any opioids at all. The other quantity-based outcomes
are intended to capture patterns that are indicative of misuse or dangerous for individuals’
health. It includes an indicator for higher than 391 days of supply in a year (more than
thirteen thirty-day prescriptions), having a daily average of opioid use higher than 120
milligram morphine equivalent (mme). The shopping outcomes include an indicator for
patients who visited more than 10 prescribers in a year to get prescriptions for opioids
and more than 10 pharmacies to fill their prescriptions for opioids. I report the summary
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statistics of these variables in Table 14. To evaluate the PDMP effect on these variables, I
use the aggregate level difference-in-difference analysis:
yst = α+ γs + λt + τpdmpst + it
Here, yst is the frequency of outcome in each state year divided by the total number of
population with at least one prescription for an opioid. γs and λt represent state and year
fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the state level. I weighted each observation
with the value of the denominator. I report the results of these estimations in Table 17.
These results can be compared with the results of Buchmueller and Carey (2017) for the
states without the “must access” PDMP requirement. Buchmueller and Carey (2017) do not
find any significant effect for similar variables and conclude that without the “must access”
specification, PDMPs are not effective. My estimation shows that PDMPs effectively reduce
the cases of +391 days of supply among prescription holders. The rate of visiting more than
10 pharmacies decreased by 0.034%. Similar to the individual-level analysis in the previous
section, the rate of opioid abuse significantly decreases among people with prescriptions.
The discrepancy among the results of the two studies are likely to be the result of the
difference between the subsample population in each study. Buchmueller and Carey (2017)
study the Medicare Part D beneficiaries, while my analysis represents the whole population,
which means that PDMPs are more effective in reducing opioid misuse among the general
population in comparison to reducing opioid misuse among Medicare Part D beneficiaries.
1.4.5. Limitation
Some limitations arise from the use of the ICD-9 codes in identifying abusers. There are
similar to those mentioned in other studies that use this method (White et al. (2009)).
This way of identification is likely to underestimate the number of cases for two reasons.
Individuals experiencing nonfatal overdoses also might be less likely to seek care because
they expect disapproval or legal consequences (Paulozzi (2012)). Also, if patients don’t use
insurance for payment of medical treatment, I won’t be able to observe them in this dataset.
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1.5. Conclusion
Despite the strong emphasis of the role of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs on the
war on prescription drug abuse, there has not been much conclusive evidence in the literature
that these programs actually reduce the abuse of these drugs. In this study, I analyze opi-
oid addiction in addition to opioid poisoning to measure the health benefits of the PDMPs.
Using a nationally representative dataset, including 25 states from 2001-2012, I show that
PDMPs have been effective in reducing the probability of abuse/addiction of opioids. The
effect is heterogeneous among different groups based on their income, education, and eth-
nicity, but more important, the effect is heterogeneous for people holding different insurance
policies. This suggests that some practices among HMO insurance providers, including a
close network of providers and referral requirements for visits to specialists, may prove to
be valuable when it comes to fighting the opioid abuse epidemic, or at least in improving
the effectiveness of PDMPs.
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1.6. Tables and Figures
Table 1: Year of PDMP implementation
State Year State Year
Alabama 2008 Massachusetts 2011
Alaska 2012 Minnesota 2010
Arizona 2009 Mississippi 2006
Arkansas 2013 New Jersey 2012
Colorado 2008 New Mexico 2006
Connecticut 2009 North Carolina 2008
Delaware 2013 North Dakota 2007
Florida 2012 Ohio 2007
Georgia 2013 Oregon 2012
Indiana 2007 South Carolina 2008
Iowa 2009 South Dakota 2012
Kansas 2011 Vermont 2009
Louisiana 2009 Washington 2012
Maine 2005 Wyoming 2004
Notes: The implementation years are user access dates reported by NAMSDL. PDMPs
are considered active in a year if providers have access to the PDMP before July of the
implementation year.
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Table 2: ICD-9 codes of abuse or addiction
ICD-9 code Description
303 alcohol dependence syndrome
3050 nondependent alcohol abuse
980 toxic effect of alcohol
3040 opioid type dependence
3055 nondependent opioid abuse
9650 poisoning opiates & related narcotics
E850 accidental poisoning-analgesic
96501 poisoning by heroin
E8500 accidental poisoning by heroin
96500 poisoning by opium, unspecified
E8502 accidental poisoning other opiates & related narcotics
96509 poison opiates & related narcotics oth
3047 comb opioid rx w/any other rx depend
96502 poisoning by methadone
E8501 accidental poisoning by methadone
3042 cocaine dependence
3056 nondependent cocaine abuse
3043 cannabis dependence
3052 nondependent cannabis abuse
3044 amphetamines & other psychostimulant depend
3057 nondependent amphetamine
3059 other mixed/unspecified nondependence drug abs
E8589 accidental poisoning unspec drug
97*** poisoning by other prescription drugs
98*** toxic effects of other prescription drugs
Notes: The codes for opioid and other drugs abuse/dependence. For the cases of opioid
abuse, the codes that are reported here are similar to those used in recent papers,
including Meara et al. (2016) and Buchmueller and Carey (2017).
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Table 4: Average number of visits per person to inpatient or outpatient facilities for each
substance
Substance Average number of visits
Alcohol 4.2
Opioids 6.6
Cocaine 3.9
Cannabis 3.9
Amphetamines 3.2
Notes: In this table, I report the average number of visits for each substance in all 50
states during 2001-2012.
Table 5: Correlation between admission for different types of substances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Alcohol 1
(2) Opioids 0.158 1
(3) Cocaine 0.184 0.181 1
(4) Cannabis 0.205 0.140 0.194 1
(5) Amphetamines 0.103 0.105 0.118 0.160 1
(6) Other meds 0.185 0.354 0.182 0.170 0.122 1
Notes: Pairwise correlations for abuse/dependence among different substances incidents.
All the numbers are significant in 0.001 level.
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Table 6: Age difference among different types of abusers
Mean age
Only opioids 38.519
(1.896)
Opioid with other substances 35.057
(2.402)
Diff(1-2) 3.462***
(2.146)
Note: This table reports the mean age of the individuals who only abuse opioids and
compares them with people who abuse opioids in combination with other substances.
Table 7: Effect of PDMPs on probability of abuse/addiction
(1) (2) (3)
PDMP −0.186∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.043)
Controls:
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Ind. Controls No Yes Yes
PDMP × Ind. Controls No No Yes
R−Square 0.019 0.040 0.041
Observations 62,708,948 56,719,688 56,719,688
Notes: Coefficients of logit regression for probability of an individual diagnosed with
abuse/addiction of a prescription opioid. Individual controls include age, gender, edu-
cation, income, and type of insurance. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level,
are in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 8: Effect of PDMPs on probability of abuse by gender, race category
Black White
Female Male Female Male
PDMP -0.198*** -0.178*** -0.151*** -0.149***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.017) (0.015)
Controls:
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 0.054 0.056 0.036 0.045
Observations 2,749,701 2,261,260 21,113,962 20,594,947
Notes: Coefficients of logit regression for probability of an individual diagnosed with
abuse/addiction of a prescription opioid. Individual controls include age, gender, edu-
cation, income, and type of insurance. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level,
are in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 11: Effect of PDMP on probability of abuse by type of insurance
Insurance
EPO HMO IND POS PPO
PDMP -0.120** -0.209*** -0.391 -0.036 0.026
(0.047) (0.053) (0.321) (0.029) (0.149)
Controls:
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 0.044 0.057 0.109 0.036 0.036
Observations 6,931,178 16,550,381 159,186 34,051,197 4,888,403
Notes: Coefficients of logit regression for probability of an individual diagnosed with abuse
or addiction of a prescription opioid for different types of insurance. All specifications con-
trol for individual characteristics including age, gender, income, and education in addition
to state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in
parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 12: Relationship between narcotic prescription and event of opioid abuse/dependence
Ever abused opioids?
No Yes
Ever been prescribed opioids?
No 69.22 0.08
Yes 30.42 0.28
Pr(abuse | prescribed)= 0.92%
Pr(abuse | not prescribed)= 0.12%
Pr(not prescribed | abuser)= 22.98%
Notes: Dataset includes the medical and prescription claims of around 19 million people in
25 states between 2001-2012. The abuse indicator is Yes if they have ever been diagnosed
with any prescription opioid abuse/addiction, and the narcotic indicator is Yes if they have
ever been prescribed any form of narcotics.
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Table 13: Effectiveness of the PDMP for patients with prescription vs. patients without
prescription
(1) w prescription (2) w/o prescription
PDMP -0.105** -0.077
(0.048) (0.079)
ln(mme+1) -0.036**
(0.014)
ln(day sup+1) 0.684***
(0.023)
Controls:
State FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Ind. Controls No No
R-Square 0.132 0.025
Observations 18,936,921 42,830,641
Percent Mean 0.378 0.059
Notes: Coefficients of logit regression for probability of an individual diagnosed with abuse
or addiction of a prescription opioid with state and year fixed effects. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01.
Table 14: Summary statistics: Outcomes among opioid takers
Mean Median 99th Percentile
Mean Daily MME 6.67 0.62 129.15
Mean MME per Prescription 60.75 36 800
Total Days of supply 32.55 6 462
Number of Prescriptions 2.75 1 24
Number of Prescribers 1.34 1 5
Number of Pharmacies 1.24 1 4
Note: Summary statistics of misuse proxy measures, constructed similar to Buchmueller
and Carey (2017).
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Table 15: Correlation of outcomes among whole population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) 391+ Days Supply 1
(2) 120+ Daily MME 0.585 1
(3) 10+ Pharmacy 0.093 0.065 1
(4) 10+ Provider 0.089 0.050 0.382 1
(5) Opioid abuse 0.094 0.093 0.061 0.080 1
Notes: Pairwise correlations for measures of misuse. All the numbers are significant in
0.001 level.
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Figure 1: Number of visits for abuse/dependence by substance category
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Note: The numbers show the frequency of visits related to each substance
abuse/dependence during 2001-2012 over 50 states.
Figure 2: Total number of people who visit any inpatient/outpatient facilities for each
substance
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Figure 3: Trend in abuse of prescription opioids by age category in 25 states
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Figure 4: Probability of prescription opioid abuse/dependence 4 years after and before the
implementation of PDMPs
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Figure 5: Relationship between narcotic prescription and event of abuse/dependence from
2001-2012
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CHAPTER 2 : Demand Estimation of Opioid Treatment
Abstract: In this paper, I develop, estimate, and compare different count models of
the demand for opioid treatment. I use medical and prescription claims data for around
20 million people. I compare the explanatory power of these models with those of the
Neural Network algorithm from machine learning. My results show that NB2 estima-
tions perform better in explaining the variations of the data in comparison with other
models including, Poisson, NB1, and OLS in pooled models, while a fixed effect Poisson
model provides the best fit in panel data regression. As long as we use the aggre-
gated level data with similar variables, the performance of classification algorithms in a
complicated method such as Neural Network is similar to regression analysis. Finally,
estimating the marginal effects of each insurance plan characteristics in the demand
for opioids indicates that demand is lower in Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO)
with an Administrative Service Only (ASO) and Health Reimbursement Arrangement
(HRA) structure. It suggests implementing similar structures in reimbursement, and
the providers’ network would reduce demand significantly.
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2.1. Introduction
Count models are extensively used for modeling healthcare utilization (Cameron and Trivedi (2013)).
In this paper, I analyze the patterns and factors contributing to the demand for opioid medications
using the medical and prescription history of patients.
The data include around 2 million people per year for 10 years. Each individual is observed in the
data for at least 3 years and is covered by some form of insurance. I measure the demand for opioids
for each person by using the number of prescriptions written in each year for them. I combine
this information with demographic information and medical record data to account for conditions
inducing pain. First, I perform pooled OLS regression analysis and then compare the outcome with
a variety of cross-sectional and longitudinal count data models. Finally, I train a Neural Network
and use a test sample to compare the performance of this algorithm with regression methods.
The most common count data models include Poisson models and the negative binomial models.
The negative binomial models are a generalized version of Poisson models that allow for variance
dispersion, V ar(yi|zi) = µi + αµpi . I use the two most commonly used penalized model selection
criteria, the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), to com-
pare the performances of different models in addition to R2. My results show that NB2, the negative
binomial with p = 2, estimations perform better in explaining the data variations in comparison
with other models including, Poisson, NB1, which is the negative binomial with p=1, and OLS
in cross-sectional form. However, a fixed effect Poisson model provides the best fit in the panel
data regression. And, as long as we are using the aggregated level data with similar variables, the
performance of classification algorithms in a complicated method such as the Neural Network is
similar to regression analysis. Estimating marginal effects from the NB2 regression suggests that
HMOs and PPOs significantly increase the number of visits by 0.22 and 0.61 in comparison with
EPS. Access service only plans reduce visits by 0.47. HRA plan holders visit doctors 0.44 and 0.66
less compared with HSA and people with no consumer access. This estimation suggests that we
could reduce the number of visits and consequently total consumption of opioids by intervening in
the insurance market and providing similar structure to that of EPO, ASO and HRA in the market
for opioid medications.
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2.2. Data
The data are an administrative panel of medical and prescription records of around 20 million people
provided by Optum. This is a subsample of Clinformatics Data Mart (CDM) that include individuals
age 11-65 who were covered by United Health Group for at least 3 years during 2001-2011 in 25
states. I aggregate the prescription data yearly to measure the demand for opioids at each individual
year. I measure demand for opioids by the number of prescriptions written for each patient in each
year. I combine these data with demographic information and the medical records of each patient.
Opioids are prescribed for a large set of health conditions associated with pain, and prescribing
practices vary widely among different providers. Each provider reports his diagnosis using up to 5
ICD-9 diagnosis codes. Although opioids are used for pain management, pain is not clearly stated in
the description of their ICD-9 codes. The issue of how to indicate the presence of a condition that
might require opioid treatment does not have a clear solution. Kilby (2016) uses a subset of data
to identify pain-related conditions based on the use of opioids as the treatment method. This might
raise the endogeneity concern, given that opioids are not the only possible treatment for pain. To
address this problem, I review the medical literature and guidelines on pain management in addition
to two pain specialists’ opinions to provide a list of 397 diagnosis codes that often involve narcotic
prescriptions as a method for pain management.1 These are the diagnosis codes for conditions
that are medically justified to be treated with an opioid. I further nest these 5 digit codes into 69
categories based on the first 3 digits that nest conditions together based on the underlying general
disease and a manifestation of a particular organ or site (World Health Organization (2006)). Table
18 reports a sample of these conditions. I create a set of dummy variables to indicate diagnosis with
any of these conditions in each year.
Table 19 shows the frequency of prescriptions written; on average, 76% of the population in each
year does not fill any prescription, 13.4% fills only one prescription, 4.1% fills two prescriptions, 1.7%
fills three prescriptions, and only 4% fill more than three prescriptions. The summary in table 20
shows that the standard deviation of the number of prescriptions is almost 4 times higher than the
average. This suggests that the distribution of this observation is more likely to fit a more dispersed
distribution such as the negative binomial rather than a Poisson distribution.
Opioid consumption in the U.S. is the highest among industrial countries. I show in the last chapter
1The main list is downloaded from http://www.aceanesthesiapain.com/ResourceCenter/IndexofDiagnosisCodes.aspx.
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that Prescription Drugs Monitoring Programs (PDMPs), which are the most important public policy
response, did not decrease the overall milligram morphine prescribed for patients. So it is important
to study the demand for opioids in more detail to understand what type of policies would be relevant.
Table 21 shows the average milligram morphine content of the prescription significantly increases
by the number of prescriptions, so decreasing the number of doctor visits might decrease the overall
consumption. In particular, it is interesting to investigate if the effect of observable characteristics
of individuals or their insurance provider can explain any variation in the prescription data.
2.3. Econometric Analysis
2.3.1. Regression analysis
I start the analysis by estimating an OLS regression for count data as the baseline model including
alternative sets of control variables:
yit = β0 + β1xit +
J∑
j=1
β2jDijt + β3pdmpst + γs + λt + it (2.1)
yit is the number of prescriptions per year, xit is the set of individual demographics and insurance
type, Dj is the set of diagnosis codes associated with opioid therapy, γs is state fixed effect, λt is
year fixed effect, and pdmpst is an indicator for the implementation of Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs(PDMPs) in state s at year t. PDMPs are the most important policy initiative in response
to the opioid abuse epidemic, and I studied their effect on different health outcomes in my previous
chapter. My results indicated the effectiveness of these programs on different health outcomes; how-
ever, these programs did not reduce the total morphine prescribed per person per year significantly.
So, I study the demand for opioids in more detail in this chapter and determine what is the best
model to explain the variation in the data and how that can provide policy advice. I compare the
performance of this estimation in fitting the data with common count models, which are Poisson
and the negative binomials (NB1, NB2). I use the AIC and BIC in addition to R2 to choose the
model that best describes the data and can be used for further exploration of policy effectiveness.
The Poisson regression model specifies yi given zi as Poisson distributed with density:
f(yi|zi) = e
−µiµyii
yi!
yi = 0, 1, 2, ..
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and the mean parameter
E(yi|zi) = µi = exp(z′iβ)
In these analyses zi = {xit, Dijt, γs, λt, pdmpst}, similar to the parameters of equation 2.1. Given
the observations, the maximum likelihood estimator used for parameter estimations is:
lnL(β) =
n∑
i=1
yiz
′
iβ − exp(z′iβ)− ln (yi!)
In the Poisson distribution, the mean and the variance of the random variable are the same. This
restriction does not match with the summary of the number of prescriptions per year in Table 20,
so we consider less restrictive models that provide a more flexible structure for the variance.
V ar(yi|zi) = µi + αµpi ,
Poisson is a special case of this model with α = 0. The NB1 variance function sets p = 1, then the
variance is:
V ar(yi|xi) = µi + αµi
where α > 0 is an overdispersion parameter. The NB2 variance function sets p = 2:
V ar(yi|xi) = µi + αµ2i
By expanding these models to longitudinal form, we can use the panel structure of the data and
estimate fixed effect models. A key benefit of using panel data instead of cross-sectional data is that
it allows for a more general individual heterogeneity, in addition to what can be observed through
individual observables (Cameron and Trivedi (2013)). Individual demographics do not change over
time, so these models will not be helpful to study the effect of individual demographics on the
outcome. But they can be used to measure the importance of variables that change over time,
mainly insurance characteristics. So , the outcomes of these models avoid the potential bias of
individual selection into different types of insurance.
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2.3.2. The Neural Network
Data mining is widely used in different disciplines. The healthcare environment is one of the areas
with a huge amount of data and a lack of effective tools for analysis of relationships and trends
in the data (Srinivas et al. (2010)). In this set of analyses, I estimate the parameters of different
Neural Networks to find the one that performs best in fitting the data. Similar to the biological
neuron structure, Neural Networks define neuron as a central processing unit and generate output
(dependent variables) from the set of inputs (independent variables). The independent variables
form the input layer; the middle layer, which performs the processing, is called the hidden layer; and
the dependent variable forms the output layer. The hidden layer converts the input to the desired
output. Figure 7 shows the structure of a simple Neural Network with 4 input variables, a hidden
layer of 5 nodes with a single outcome (Mu¨ller et al. (2012)).
In a regression analysis model, we use the whole data to estimate the parameters of the model, but
to avoid overfitting the data in a Neural Network, we first train the model with a random subset
of the data to estimate the vector of parameters. Then we use these estimates to measure the
performance of the model on test data. I measure the performance by comparing AIC, BIC, and R2
of the model with regression outcomes. Regression models assume a restrictive relation between the
explanatory variables, while data mining algorithms provide more flexibility in terms of interaction
between the variables. Specifically, in the regression analysis, most of the explanatory power results
from including the diagnosis codes of pain-related conditions. It seems reasonable to expect a more
complicated relationship between this set of variables and the outcome observed in the data. I train
a Neural Network using 70% of the data and compare the R2 of the fitted model on the test sample
with R2 calculated in regression estimations. In the next section, I report the estimation parameters
of each model and compare their performance using AIC, BIC, and R2.
2.4. Results
Table 22 provides the results of OLS and Poisson estimations with and without controls for diagnosis
codes. It is clear that including the diagnosis codes significantly improves the explanatory power
of both models. After controlling for diagnosis codes, gender is not significant in determining the
number of prescriptions that patients receive each year. The number of prescriptions increases
with age, but decreases with income and education level. White people get more prescription
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Figure 7: A simple Neural Network structure
than any other race group. People with Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) insurance have
the most number of prescription followed by the Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) holders.
Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO) holders, which I used as the base group, have the lowest
average number of visits. Table 22 shows that Poisson regression fits the data better with pseudo-
R2 = 17.7% in comparison with R2 = 12.5% of the OLS regression. It also has a higher value for
likelihood function. PDMPs increase the number of visits, although not significantly.
Table 23 provides the results of NB1 and NB2 estimations. These two models mostly suggest similar
patterns to those shown in Table 22; the main difference arises in the NB1 model. The NB1 model
indicates that men significantly get fewer prescriptions and that the type of insurance does not
change the access to prescriptions among patients. These are big discrepancies and make the choice
of correct model important.
These are nonnested models, so the best criteria to compare their fitness to data are the use of AIC
and BIC. Table 24 provides these information criteria for the OLS, Poisson, NB1, and NB2 models.
The values of both AIC and BIC are lowest for the NB2 model, which suggests the distribution of
the number of prescriptions follows a negative binomial distribution with parameter p=1. However,
the Poisson regression has the highest value for R2.
In these regression estimations, I model the number of visits as depending on the number of the
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type of insurance. Insurance variables are treated as exogenous, but health insurance is frequently a
choice variable rather than being assigned. It raises the concern of selection bias and invalidates the
causal interpretation of insurance effect on the outcome in the next part. To address this concern, I
estimate the model including fixed effects which controls for the unobservable characteristics of the
individual.
The panel data format allows estimation of regressions with random and fixed effects. The random
effect estimator assumes that random effects are iid distributed over time and are uncorrelated
with regressors, which means unobservable individual effects are not correlated with individuals’
observables. This assumption does not seem justifiable for patients given that the unobservable
characteristics of a diagnosis would be highly correlated with the type of diagnosis for each patient.
The outcomes of these regressions are reported in Table 25. The coefficients are not significant
in random effect models. Further, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of uncorrelated
individual observables and unobservables. AIC and BIC values reported in Table 26 confirm that
the Poisson FE model is the model that fits the data most closely.2
To make the estimation of the Neural Network model computationally feasible, I restrict the sample
to individuals with 9 years of coverage. Then, I randomly select 70% of the observations to train
three Neural Networks. The number of input variables significantly reduces the speed of convergence
in the estimation of Neural Networks, so I reduce the number of inputs. To reduce the number of
independent variables without losing much of the information, I impose the principal component
analysis method to the set of diagnosis codes. The estimation indicates that 95% of the variation
in diagnosis codes can be explained by 15 principal components. I use these 15 vectors in addition
to demographic information as input variables of the Neural Network. I utilize the estimation
parameters to predict the dependent variable in the test sample and compare the prediction values
with actual observations in the data to calculate pseudo-R2. Figure 7 shows the two sets of estimated
models with AIC, BIC, and R2 parameters reported in Table 27. The Neural Network with 15 nodes
in hidden layer performs slightly better in terms of R2, but it has higher AIC and BIC. So, the Neural
Network with 10 nodes in the hidden layer is the best Neural Network to fit the variation in these
data but it still doesn’t improve the estimation compare with the NB2 model.
Comparison of the different plans indicates the importance of the insurance plans in the demand
2 The likelihood functions are not concave for fixed effect and random effect negative binomial models,
so the parameters of these models cannot be estimated.
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for opioids. I estimate pooled data OLS and pooled data NB2 regression, including more control
variables for characteristics of each prescription. Including more variables reduces the sample to
individuals who received opioid treatment during the data but allows for a richer set of control
variables, including the average morphine equivalent of each prescription, average days of supply
in each prescription, and average copay for each prescription. Including these controls ensures that
the differences in the number of prescriptions are not a result of variation in the quantity of opioids
prescribed for each visit.
Table 28 reports the marginal effects of these characteristics. OLS estimation suggests that the
HMO enrollees receive 0.06 more prescriptions compared with EPO enrollees. PPO enrollees get
0.2 more prescriptions per year compare with EPO enrollees. Administrative Service Only (ASO)
is another characteristic of insurance plans. In insurance plans with ASO, employers have more
freedom in managing claims and benefits, which results in 0.12 fewer prescriptions for patients.
Consumer Driven Health Plan (CDHP) is a code that defines different payment arrangments. It can
be a Health Reimbursement Arrangement (HRA) or a health saving arrangement (HSA) or neither.
In the HRA plans, the employers’ fund does not accumulate in a separate fund, and the employer
only pays after the employee incurs expenses. Insurance plans with HRA reduce the number of
prescriptions by about 0.15 compared with HSA or not having any payment plans. Calculation of
marginal effects from NB2 model results in larger effects. The first column in the table shows that
HMO and PPO significantly increase the number of visits by 0.22 and 0.61 in comparison with EPO.
Indemnity (IND), Point of Service (POS) and other plans also increase the number of visits, but not
significantly. Access service only plans reduce visits by 0.47. HRA plan holders visit doctors 0.44 and
0.66 less compared with HSA and people with no consumer access. This estimation suggests that
we could significantly reduce the number of visits and consequently total consumption of opioids by
intervening in the insurance market. A plan that leads to lower demand for opioids should provide
a structure similar to EPS, ASO, and HRA in the market for opioid medications.
2.5. Conclusion and Discussion
There is a large set of count models that might seem appropriate for this type of data, including
zero-inflated models, finite mixture models, and zero-truncated models, but the estimation of these
models was not possible. Most of the variables in these data are categorical variables, which turn
the likelihood functions to a nonconcave function, over a reasonable set of starting values.
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This paper compares the performance of a set of regression models in predicting the number of
prescriptions for patients and compares the results with the outcome of a Neural Network model.
The NB2 model proves the best in describing the data in the cross-sectional form, while the Poisson
FE model is the most appropriate one using the panel structure of the data. PDMPs slightly,
but not significantly, increase the number of the prescriptions written in a year. Age is the most
significant explanatory variable. Demand for opioids increases by age, higher education and income
lead to lower demand, while whites are the racial group with the highest demand for opioids. Finally,
estimating the marginal effects of each insurance plans’ characteristics in the demand for opioids
indicates that demand is lower in EPOs with ASO and HRA structure, so implementing similar
structures in reimbursement and providers network would reduce demand significantly.
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Table 18: ICD-9 Codes for a sample of pain-related conditions
ICD-9 Code Condition
053.2 HERPES ZOSTER DERMAT
053.21 HERPES ZOSTER KERATO
053.22 HERPES ZOSTER IRIDOC
053.29 HERPES ZOSTER WITH O
053.71 OTITIS EXTERNA DUE T
053.79 HERPES ZOSTER WITH O
250.6 DIABETES WITH NEUROL
250.61 DIABETES WITH NEUROL
250.62 DIABETES WITH NEUROL
250.63 DIABETES WITH NEUROL
346 MIGRAINE WITH AURA,
346.01 MIGRAINE WITH AURA
346.02 MIGRAINE WITH AURA
346.03 MIGRAINE WITH AURA
Notes: The table provides an example of codes reported in the list of ICD-9 pain-related
conditions.
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Figure 8: Neural Network with 5, 10, and 15 nodes in the hidden layer
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Table 19: Frequency distribution of number of prescriptions
Number of prescriptions Count Percent %
0 14,796,379 76.8
1 2,588,495 13.4
2 787,441 4.1
3 320,451 1.7
4 166,398 0.9
5 100,855 0.5
+6 497,341 2.6
Total 19,257,360 100.0
Notes: The data include aggregated total number of prescriptions received by each patient
for around 20 million people in 25 states from 2001-2012.
Table 20: Summary of number of prescriptions
Variable Obs Mean Std Min Max
Number of prescriptions 19,257,360 0.653567 2.394603 0 266
Table 21: Summary of MME per prescription
Number of prescriptions Mean MME
1 264.3086
2 316.0151
3 375.9809
4 474.0938
5 558.5545
+6 1467.712
Total 430.1026
Notes: The table reports the average milligram morphine equivalent of each prescription.
Data include around 20 million people in 25 states from 2001-2011.
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Table 22: OLS and Poisson estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Poisson Poisson OLS OLS
PDMP 0.00419 0.0115 0.00996 0.0137
(0.0134) (0.0144) (0.00798) (0.00995)
Gender -0.110*** 0.00483 -0.0710*** -0.00464
(0.0237) (0.0161) (0.0142) (0.00994)
Age = 18-23 0.842*** 0.817*** 0.181*** 0.157***
(0.0229) (0.0217) (0.00655) (0.00483)
Age = 24-33 1.239*** 1.150*** 0.353*** 0.278***
(0.0386) (0.0367) (0.0207) (0.0169)
Age = 34-43 1.503*** 1.331*** 0.513*** 0.377***
(0.0422) (0.0387) (0.0271) (0.0208)
Age = 44-53 1.708*** 1.461*** 0.668*** 0.471***
(0.0427) (0.0392) (0.0336) (0.0249)
Age = 54-64 1.670*** 1.357*** 0.643*** 0.380***
(0.0332) (0.0301) (0.0267) (0.0182)
Income = 1 0.0351* 0.0276* 0.0512*** 0.0436***
(0.0197) (0.0164) (0.0141) (0.0121)
Income = 2 -0.00584 0.00190 0.0156 0.0181
(0.0262) (0.0194) (0.0199) (0.0155)
Income = 3 -0.0665** -0.0471** -0.0336* -0.0217
(0.0271) (0.0215) (0.0195) (0.0156)
Income = 4 -0.111*** -0.0799*** -0.0671*** -0.0493***
(0.0281) (0.0209) (0.0185) (0.0144)
Income = 5 -0.201*** -0.159*** -0.127*** -0.0981***
(0.0310) (0.0232) (0.0183) (0.0139)
Income = 6 -0.322*** -0.262*** -0.196*** -0.155***
(0.0286) (0.0201) (0.0166) (0.0124)
Education = B 0.0989* 0.0811* 0.0922** 0.0824**
(0.0556) (0.0487) (0.0357) (0.0316)
Education = C -0.0181 -0.00896 0.00275 0.0126
(0.0645) (0.0540) (0.0434) (0.0362)
Education = D -0.269*** -0.219*** -0.124*** -0.0874**
(0.0657) (0.0535) (0.0428) (0.0340)
Race = B 0.509*** 0.436*** 0.173*** 0.116***
(0.0475) (0.0438) (0.0232) (0.0168)
Race = H 0.252** 0.173 0.0423 -0.0178
(0.113) (0.106) (0.0450) (0.0401)
Race = W 0.692*** 0.591*** 0.301*** 0.228***
(0.0377) (0.0395) (0.0226) (0.0211)
Insurance = HMO 0.102*** 0.0740*** 0.0661*** 0.0457***
(0.0197) (0.0159) (0.0128) (0.0113)
Insurance = IND 0.151** 0.0554 0.138** 0.0636
(0.0646) (0.0430) (0.0567) (0.0423)
Insurance = OTH 0.283*** 0.145*** 0.186** 0.135***
(0.0644) (0.0559) (0.0692) (0.0375)
Insurance = POS -0.00428 0.0147 -0.00130 0.00927
(0.0304) (0.0224) (0.0199) (0.0151)
Insurance = PPO 0.0685 0.0623** 0.0493 0.0450*
(0.0462) (0.0293) (0.0318) (0.0219)
Constant -2.451*** -2.643*** -0.0550 -0.196***
(0.154) (0.111) (0.102) (0.0697)
Observations 18,871,999 18,871,999 18,871,999 18,871,999
R-squared 0.0500 0.177 0.016 0.125
Ind. FE No No No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sate FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Diag Controls No Yes No Yes
Ln L -2.940e+07 -2.540e+07 -4.310e+07 -4.200e+07
Notes: Coefficients of the Poisson and OLS regressions for the number of prescription for
opioids per individual year. Diagnosis controls include 69 3-digit ICD-9 codes related to
pain. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. * p <0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01
53
Table 23: NB1 and NB2 estimation results
(1) (2)
VARIABLES NB1 NB2
PDMP 0.0135 0.0168
(0.0112) (0.0124)
Gender -0.0294*** -0.0202
(0.00605) (0.0147)
Age= 18-23 0.671*** 0.818***
(0.0199) (0.0225)
Age= 24-33 0.793*** 1.076***
(0.0290) (0.0405)
Age= 34-43 0.813*** 1.238***
(0.0314) (0.0419)
Age= 44-53 0.829*** 1.394***
(0.0316) (0.0406)
Age= 54-64 0.771*** 1.336***
(0.0256) (0.0299)
Income= 1 0.0117 0.0416***
(0.0117) (0.0143)
Income= 2 -0.00667 0.00782
(0.0141) (0.0203)
Income= 3 -0.0361** -0.0389*
(0.0149) (0.0223)
Income= 4 -0.0594*** -0.0796***
(0.0136) (0.0229)
Income= 5 -0.106*** -0.152***
(0.0135) (0.0244)
Income= 6 -0.157*** -0.255***
(0.0113) (0.0208)
Education = B 0.0634* 0.113**
(0.0353) (0.0470)
Education = C 0.00137 0.0184
(0.0418) (0.0565)
Education = D -0.131*** -0.176***
(0.0439) (0.0591)
Race = B 0.321*** 0.447***
(0.0287) (0.0415)
Race = H 0.146** 0.202**
(0.0671) (0.0998)
Race = W 0.388*** 0.586***
(0.0282) (0.0402)
Insurance = HMO 0.00708 0.0622***
(0.00871) (0.0150)
Insurance = IND -0.0126 0.0771
(0.0295) (0.0520)
Insurance = OTH -0.0354 0.161***
(0.0716) (0.0275)
Insurance = POS -0.00708 0.0104
(0.0185) (0.0256)
Insurance = PPO 0.0156 0.0584*
(0.0218) (0.0310)
Constant -1.825*** -2.724***
(0.0799) (0.113)
Observations 18,871,999 18,871,999
R-squared 0.0560 0.0614
Ind. FE No No
Year FE Yes Yes
Sate FE Yes Yes
Ind. Controls Yes Yes
Diag Controls Yes Yes
Ln L -1.660e+07 -1.650e+07
Notes: Coefficients of the NB1 and NB2 regressions for the number of prescription for
opioids per individual year. Diagnosis controls include 69 3-digit ICD-9 codes related to
pain. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. * p <0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01
54
Table 24: Cross-sectional data: Model comparison
Model Obs Ln L null Ln L df AIC BIC
OLS 18,871,999 -4.32E+07 -4.20E+07 24 8.39E+07 8.39E+07
Poisson 18,871,999 -3.09E+07 -2.54E+07 25 5.09E+07 5.09E+07
NB1 18,871,999 -1.76E+07 -1.66E+07 24 3.32E+07 3.32E+07
NB2 18,871,999 -1.76E+07 -1.65E+07 25 3.30E+07 3.30E+07
Table 25: Panel data models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables OLS RE OLS FE Poisson RE Poisson FE
PDMP 0.0734*** 0.0960*** 0.108 0.148***
(0.0172) (0.0182) (0.203) (0.000931)
Insurance = HMO -0.0212 -0.0964*** -0.0349 -0.132***
(0.0418) (0.0175) (0.445) (0.00609)
Insurance = IND 0.175*** -0.185** 0.227 -0.194***
(0.0442) (0.0869) (0.696) (0.0382)
Insurance = OTH -0.00509 -0.266 -0.00156 -0.374***
(0.0719) (0.236) (0.954) (0.0351)
Insurance = POS -0.000407 0.0194* -0.000345 0.0399***
(0.0203) (0.0106) (0.268) (0.00578)
Insurance = PPO 0.0304 -0.0530*** 0.0228 -0.0827***
(0.0285) (0.0122) (0.484) (0.00834)
/lnalpha 0.987
(4.164)
Constant 0.444*** 0.492*** -0.843*
(0.0146) (0.00713) (0.490)
Observations 19,257,360 19,257,360 21,913,723 12,745,615
R-squared 0.049
Number of patid 3,953,438 3,953,438 5,542,282 2,623,263
Year FE No No No No
State FE No No No No
Diag Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ln L -1.910e+07 -9.663e+06
Notes: Coefficients of the Poisson and OLS regressions with individual random effect
and individual fixed effect for the number of prescriptions for opioids per individual year.
Diagnosis controls include 69 3-digit ICD-9 codes related to pain. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 26: Panel data: Model comparison
Model Obs Ln L df AIC BIC
OLS RE 19,257,360 . 24 . .
OLS FE 19,257,360 -3.15E+07 24 6.30E+07 6.30E+07
Poisson RE 21,913,723 -1.91E+07 76 3.82E+07 3.82E+07
Poisson FE 12,745,615 -9663393 74 1.93E+07 1.93E+07
Table 27: Neural Network: Model comparison
Model Hidden Error AIC BIC R2
Neural Network 10 83.11444 768.2289 4549.522 0.129
Neural Network 15 82.53771 1067.07541 6732.7335 0.133
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Table 28: Marginal effect of insurance characteristics on number of prescriptions
(1) (2)
Variables NB2 OLS
Insurance = HMO 0.218* 0.0668
(0.113) (0.0451)
Insurance = IND 0.701 0.219
(0.428) (0.158)
Insurance = OTH 0.777*** 0.297***
(0.129) (0.0496)
Insurance = POS 0.0728 0.0159
(0.136) (0.0318)
Insurance = PPO 0.613*** 0.209***
(0.197) (0.0565)
ASO -0.467*** -0.126***
(0.140) (0.0445)
CDHP = HSA 0.440* 0.155*
(0.250) (0.0835)
CDHP = NO HRA/HSA 0.663*** 0.180***
(0.174) (0.0472)
Observations 729,191 729,191
R-squared 0.287
Year FE Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes
Ind. Controls Yes Yes
Diag Controls Yes Yes
Notes: Marginal effects of the NB2 and OLS regressions for the number of prescriptions
for opioids per individual year. Diagnosis controls include 69 3-digit ICD-9 codes related
to pain. Individual controls include age, age square, education, gender, and race. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p <0.01
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